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fulmine: compliance suites (h1, h2, ws) and resilience - #1826
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Signed-off-by: Nigro Simone <[email protected]>
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/spec -f fulmine --save |
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/resilience -f fulmine --save |
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/spec --save |
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👋 Spec request received. A collaborator will review and approve the run. |
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/resilience -f fulmine --save |
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👋 Resilience request received. A collaborator will review and approve the run. |
Spec ResultsFramework: Compliance
H/1.1: 4 failed
H/2: 9 failed
Full log |
🛡️ Resilience ReportAdversarial load against each opted-in entry in a fixed memory/CPU box — does it survive, shed load, hang, or run out of memory? Verdicts are not scored into the composite. See docs. ✅ survived (1 pt) ·
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| Attack | Exhausts | Verdict | Peak RSS | Liveness fail | Recovery | Client est./reaped | Load (req/s · CPU L→S) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
slow-body |
memory | ✅ survived | 374.3 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 32768 / 32768 | — · 2.73→0.25 |
slow-headers |
connections | ✅ survived | 287.2 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 32768 / 32768 | — · 4.05→0.17 |
slow-read |
memory | 💥 oom-killed | 4096.1 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 28847 / 5466 | — · 4.14→0.63 |
huge-chunk |
memory | ✅ survived | 202.4 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 32768 / 32768 | — · 6.87→0.39 |
tiny-chunk-flood |
cpu | 3270 / 4096 MiB | 88.9% | 0s | 9903 / 7593 | 58 · 1.38→1.98 | |
chunk-extension-flood |
cpu | ✅ survived | 453.1 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0.4s | 32768 / 0 | — · 3.73→0.91 |
chunk-size-overflow |
cpu | ✅ survived | 189.7 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 32768 / 32768 | — · 6.05→0.42 |
content-length-prealloc |
memory | ✅ survived | 451.2 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 32768 / 31393 | — · 2.69→0.4 |
large-upload |
memory | 💥 oom-killed | 4107.4 / 4096 MiB | 60% | 0s | 29167 / 29167 | — · 10.3→1.36 |
expect-100-continue |
memory | ✅ survived | 431.6 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 32768 / 0 | — · 2.65→0.49 |
keepalive-hoard |
connections | ✅ survived | 258.9 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 32768 / 0 | — · 3.13→0.27 |
header-bomb |
memory | ✅ survived | 629.8 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 32768 / 32768 | 8k · 26.41→0.85 |
header-count-flood |
memory | ✅ survived | 573.7 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 32768 / 32768 | 12k · 18.74→0.74 |
duplicate-header-merge |
cpu | ✅ survived | 516.3 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 32768 / 32768 | 12k · 12.12→0.64 |
pipelining-flood |
memory | 457 / 4096 MiB | 66.7% | 72.8s | 3741 / 0 | 29.7M · 4.15→1.95 | |
trailer-flood |
memory | ✅ survived | 137.4 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 32768 / 32768 | — · 7.87→0.32 |
decompression-bomb |
memory | 🟠 hung | 1294.9 / 4096 MiB | 84.2% | dead | 4894 / 350 | 180 · 0.69→1.89 |
decomp-codec-bypass |
memory | 🟠 hung | 1321.9 / 4096 MiB | 85% | dead | 5947 / 1605 | 205 · 0.76→1.89 |
hashdos |
cpu | 💥 oom-killed | 4130.8 / 4096 MiB | 41.7% | 0s | 23485 / 19409 | 7k · 2.7→1.08 |
json-nesting-bomb |
cpu | 💥 oom-killed | 4148 / 4096 MiB | 80% | 0s | 29424 / 29424 | 15k · 3.95→1.63 |
multipart-flood |
memory | 💥 oom-killed | 4304 / 4096 MiB | 57.1% | 0s | 25267 / 25267 | 2k · 8.7→1.66 |
redos-headers |
cpu | ✅ survived | 186.2 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 32768 / 32768 | 26k · 10→0.38 |
qvalue-cpu-bomb |
cpu | ✅ survived | 134.1 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 32768 / 32768 | 23k · 13.06→0.37 |
cookie-flood |
memory | ✅ survived | 150.1 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 32768 / 32768 | 26k · 11.33→0.37 |
percent-decode-quadratic |
cpu | ✅ survived | 174.5 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 32768 / 32768 | 25k · 11.94→0.39 |
range-bomb |
memory | ✅ survived | 144 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 32768 / 32768 | 26k · 12.57→0.37 |
json-bignum |
cpu | 3467.1 / 4096 MiB | 83.3% | 0s | 17844 / 3565 | 8k · 1.18→1.91 | |
continuation-flood |
memory | ✅ survived | 197.1 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 24936 / 24936 | 643k · 20.75→1.37 |
hpack-bomb |
memory | ✅ survived | 128 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 7105 / 7105 | 134k · 4.57→1.65 |
rapid-reset |
cpu | ✅ survived | 628.8 / 4096 MiB | 9.1% | 0.3s | 1458 / 1458 | 7.3M · 44.63→2 |
madeyoureset |
cpu | ✅ survived | 343.8 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 32768 / 32768 | 11.9M · 66.97→1.49 |
settings-flood |
cpu | ✅ survived | 218.4 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 15688 / 15687 | 22.0M · 48.77→0.91 |
ping-flood |
cpu | ✅ survived | 254.9 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 16083 / 16083 | 29.8M · 58.78→1.03 |
empty-frame-flood |
cpu | ✅ survived | 556.1 / 4096 MiB | 34.6% | 0s | 13274 / 13018 | 19.8M · 115.5→1.92 |
window-stall |
memory | 💥 oom-killed | 4096 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 13174 / 2952 | — · 1.59→1.21 |
ws-giant-frame |
memory | ✅ survived | 96.5 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 32768 / 32768 | 25k · 23.78→0.84 |
ws-fragment-bomb |
memory | ✅ survived | 718.8 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 32768 / 32768 | 5.4M · 34.25→1.39 |
ws-deflate-bomb |
memory | ✅ survived | 587 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 32768 / 32768 | 4k · 13.9→0.54 |
ws-pong-flood |
memory | 💥 oom-killed | 4105 / 4096 MiB | 46.2% | 0s | 10098 / 10098 | 51.0M · 109.45→1.48 |
tls-handshake-flood |
cpu | ✅ survived | 153.8 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 328 / 0 | 486 · 3.35→1.98 |
dheat |
cpu | ✅ survived | 76.4 / 4096 MiB | 0% | 0s | 0 / 0 |
— · 0.86→0.13 |
What each attack does
slow-body— Drip a large declared body one byte at a time; tests the body-read timeout / whole-body buffering.slow-headers— Hold connections with an unfinished, ever-growing header block; tests header-read timeout / caps.slow-read— Request a large response then read it ~1 byte/sec; tests the send/write timeout and response buffering.huge-chunk— Announce a 0x7fffffffffffffff-byte chunk; tests whether the server pre-allocates the declared chunk buffer.tiny-chunk-flood— A chunked body of millions of 1-byte chunks; tests per-chunk framing/dechunk overhead.chunk-extension-flood— 1-byte chunks each carrying a huge chunk-extension; tests read-amplification in the chunk parser (CVE-2023-39326).chunk-size-overflow— A chunk-size near 2**64; tests whether chunk-size arithmetic overflows and crashes the parser.content-length-prealloc— Declare a huge Content-Length and send no body; tests whether the read buffer is sized from the declared length (CVE-2026-5440).large-upload— A huge uncompressed body delivered fast; tests whole-body buffering and the max-body-size cap.expect-100-continue— Expect: 100-continue + a large Content-Length, body withheld; tests buffer reservation on the 100-continue handshake (CVE-2020-10705).keepalive-hoard— Many complete keep-alive requests held idle; tests the idle-timeout and max-connection caps.header-bomb— One complete request with a single enormous header value; tests the per-field / total header size cap.header-count-flood— Very many tiny distinct header fields; tests the header-COUNT cap (CVE-2026-28980 era).duplicate-header-merge— The same header name repeated N times; tests whether duplicates are joined with O(n^2) concatenation before dispatch.pipelining-flood— Thousands of pipelined requests on one socket, responses unread; tests whether the inbound queue is bounded (CVE-2026-54273).trailer-flood— A chunked body followed by an unbounded trailer section; tests the trailer-count cap, a header-limit blind spot (CVE-2026-22815 era).decompression-bomb— A small gzip request body that inflates to gigabytes; tests whether request Content-Encoding is decoded unbounded.decomp-codec-bypass— A deflate bomb labelled Content-Encoding: deflate; tests whether non-gzip request codecs are decoded unbounded (CVE-2026-42587 era).hashdos— A form body of many keys; tests whether the body is parsed into an un-seeded hash map (O(n^2), CVE-2011-3414 era).json-nesting-bomb— A tiny, deeply nested JSON body; tests the recursion-depth cap of the request-body parser (stack overflow -> crash).multipart-flood— multipart/form-data with tens of thousands of tiny parts; tests the part/field-count cap.redos-headers— Header values crafted for catastrophic regex backtracking; tests the header parsers (Accept/Content-Disposition/Range).qvalue-cpu-bomb— A huge Accept-Language list; tests O(n^2) q-value sorting before dispatch (CVE-2020-27223).cookie-flood— One Cookie header of many tiny pairs under the byte cap; tests the cookie-COUNT cap (CVE-2025-58186).percent-decode-quadratic— A path of many percent-encoded tokens; tests super-linear percent-decoding in the router (CVE-2026-45822).range-bomb— Many overlapping byte ranges on a static file; tests multipart/byteranges response amplification (Apache-Killer, CVE-2011-3192).json-bignum— A single gigantic JSON numeric literal; tests arbitrary-precision number parsing (BigDecimal / quadratic int, CVE-2023-4043).continuation-flood— Endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames with no END_HEADERS (CVE-2024-27316); tests the header-block cap.hpack-bomb— One ~4 KB HPACK dynamic-table entry referenced by thousands of 1-byte indices (CVE-2016-6581 family); tests header-list size caps.rapid-reset— Open-then-immediately-RST streams in a tight loop (CVE-2023-44487); tests unbounded stream dispatch.madeyoureset— Force server-side RST via WINDOW_UPDATE(0) per stream (CVE-2025-8671); tests the Rapid-Reset-mitigation bypass.settings-flood— Flood SETTINGS frames the peer must ACK (CVE-2019-9515).ping-flood— Flood PING frames the peer must ACK (CVE-2019-9512).empty-frame-flood— Flood zero-length DATA frames with no END_STREAM (CVE-2019-9518); tests per-frame overhead handling.window-stall— Open many streams at a 0 flow-control window and never grant it (CVE-2019-9517); tests stalled-stream buffering/timeouts.ws-giant-frame— A WebSocket frame header declaring a 2**63 payload length; tests receive-buffer pre-allocation from the declared length.ws-fragment-bomb— Endless WebSocket continuation frames with no FIN; tests the fragment-aggregation cap (CVE-2026-48779).ws-deflate-bomb— A permessage-deflate frame that inflates to gigabytes; tests the inflated-message cap (CVE-2026-1526 era).ws-pong-flood— Flood PING frames, never read; tests whether the auto-PONG queue is bounded (CVE-2026-109932).tls-handshake-flood— Many full TLS handshakes; the server pays the asymmetric crypto each time (THC-SSL-DOS class).dheat— Offer only DHE and flood handshakes; forces a modular exponentiation per handshake, or reports immune if no DHE is offered (CVE-2002-20001).
This adds the compliance suites (h1, h2, ws) and the resilience suite to the fulmine entry.
/specand/spec/headersas in the docs, on 8080 and on the HTTP/2 listeners (8443 and 8082)./parsefor the parser attacks: JSON, urlencoded, multipart and raw with decompression, all with the default limits.maxPayloadLengthfrom 16 KB to 64 KB, because Autobahn sends messages of 64 KB. The ws profiles send small messages, so the benchmark does not change.Local run: h1 155/159, h2 136/145 (TLS and h2c the same), ws 244/244. The h1 failures are in the uWS parser, the h2 ones in node:http2.