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fulmine: compliance suites (h1, h2, ws) and resilience - #1826

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This adds the compliance suites (h1, h2, ws) and the resilience suite to the fulmine entry.

  • /spec and /spec/headers as in the docs, on 8080 and on the HTTP/2 listeners (8443 and 8082).
  • /parse for the parser attacks: JSON, urlencoded, multipart and raw with decompression, all with the default limits.
  • WebSocket maxPayloadLength from 16 KB to 64 KB, because Autobahn sends messages of 64 KB. The ws profiles send small messages, so the benchmark does not change.

Local run: h1 155/159, h2 136/145 (TLS and h2c the same), ws 244/244. The h1 failures are in the uWS parser, the h2 ones in node:http2.

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nigrosimone commented Nov 17, 2026 •

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/spec -f fulmine --save

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nigrosimone commented Nov 17, 2026 •

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/resilience -f fulmine --save

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MDA2AV commented Nov 17, 2026

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/spec --save

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👋 Spec request received. A collaborator will review and approve the run.

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MDA2AV commented Nov 17, 2026

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/resilience -f fulmine --save

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👋 Resilience request received. A collaborator will review and approve the run.

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Spec Results

Framework: fulmine

Compliance

Suite Tool Score Failed
H/1.1 (h1) http11probe d50d818 155 / 159 4
H/2 (h2) h2spec 2.6.0 136 / 145 (tls 136/145, h2c 136/145) 9
WebSocket (ws) autobahn-testsuite 25.10.1 244 / 244 0
H/1.1: 4 failed
Test Expected Got
COMP-HOST-WITH-PATH Host header with path component must be rejected (RFC 9112 §3.2, MUST) 400 or close 200, connection left open
COMP-OPTIONS-STAR OPTIONS * is the only valid asterisk-form request (RFC 9112 §3.2.4, MUST) 2xx or 405; close/timeout = warn 400, connection closed
COMP-HTTP10-DEFAULT-CLOSE HTTP/1.0 without keep-alive — server should close connection after response (RFC 9112 §9.3, SHOULD) 2xx + close 400, connection closed
COMP-CHUNKED-TRAILER-VALID Valid chunked body with trailer field should be accepted (RFC 9112 §7.1.2, MUST) 2xx + echo 400, connection closed
H/2: 9 failed
Test Expected Got
http2/5.1/8 closed: Sends a DATA frame after sending RST_STREAM frame GOAWAY Frame (Error Code: STREAM_CLOSED) or RST_STREAM Frame (Error Code: STREAM_CLOSED) or Connection closed DATA Frame (length:7, flags:0x00, stream_id:1)
http2/5.1/9 closed: Sends a HEADERS frame after sending RST_STREAM frame GOAWAY Frame (Error Code: STREAM_CLOSED) or RST_STREAM Frame (Error Code: STREAM_CLOSED) or Connection closed DATA Frame (length:7, flags:0x00, stream_id:1)
http2/5.1/11 closed: Sends a DATA frame GOAWAY Frame (Error Code: STREAM_CLOSED) or RST_STREAM Frame (Error Code: STREAM_CLOSED) or Connection closed Timeout
http2/5.1/12 closed: Sends a HEADERS frame GOAWAY Frame (Error Code: STREAM_CLOSED) or Connection closed Timeout
http2/5.1.1/2 Sends stream identifier that is numerically smaller than previous GOAWAY Frame (Error Code: PROTOCOL_ERROR) or Connection closed DATA Frame (length:0, flags:0x01, stream_id:5)
http2/5.3.1/2 Sends PRIORITY frame that depend on itself GOAWAY Frame (Error Code: PROTOCOL_ERROR) or RST_STREAM Frame (Error Code: PROTOCOL_ERROR) or Connection closed Timeout
http2/6.3/1 Sends a PRIORITY frame with 0x0 stream identifier GOAWAY Frame (Error Code: PROTOCOL_ERROR) or Connection closed Timeout
http2/6.7/2 Sends a PING frame with ACK PING Frame (length:8, flags:0x01, stream_id:0, opaque_data:h2spec\x00\x00) Connection closed
http2/6.9.1/3 Sends multiple WINDOW_UPDATE frames increasing the flow control window to above 2^31-1 on a stream RST_STREAM Frame (Error Code: FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR) Connection closed
Full log
[info] framework: fulmine (fulmine.js, JS)
[info] subscribed tests: baseline,latency-1m,latency-10k,latency-500k-8cpu,pipelined,limited-conn,async,json-comp,8gbit,async-db,static-tls,echo-ws,echo-ws-pipeline,echo-ws-limited,json-tls,gateway-64,gateway-h3,production-stack,fortunes,baseline-h2,static-h2,baseline-h2c,json-h2c
[info] compliance suites: h1 h2 ws
[info] building image: httparena-fulmine
#0 building with "default" instance using docker driver

#1 [internal] load build definition from Dockerfile
#1 transferring dockerfile: 782B done
#1 DONE 0.0s

#2 [internal] load metadata for docker.io/library/node:26-trixie-slim
#2 DONE 0.7s

#3 [internal] load .dockerignore
#3 transferring context: 2B done
#3 DONE 0.0s

#4 [internal] load build context
#4 transferring context: 13.22kB done
#4 DONE 0.0s

#5 [build 1/6] FROM docker.io/library/node:26-trixie-slim@sha256:e6bedef217677b276c591795e169840edd9096dbf13f29df8ef8d1856b8820bc
#5 resolve docker.io/library/node:26-trixie-slim@sha256:e6bedef217677b276c591795e169840edd9096dbf13f29df8ef8d1856b8820bc 0.1s done
#5 DONE 0.1s

#6 [build 3/6] RUN git config --global url."https://github.com/".insteadOf "ssh://[email protected]/"
#6 CACHED

#7 [build 4/6] WORKDIR /app
#7 CACHED

#8 [build 6/6] RUN npm install --omit=dev
#8 CACHED

#9 [stage-1 2/6] RUN apt-get update &&     apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends ca-certificates curl libpq5 &&     rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
#9 CACHED

#10 [build 2/6] RUN apt-get update &&     apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends ca-certificates git python3 make g++ libpq-dev &&     rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
#10 CACHED

#11 [stage-1 5/6] COPY app.js .
#11 CACHED

#12 [build 5/6] COPY package.json .
#12 CACHED

#13 [stage-1 4/6] COPY --from=build /app/node_modules ./node_modules
#13 CACHED

#14 [stage-1 3/6] WORKDIR /app
#14 CACHED

#15 [stage-1 6/6] COPY views ./views
#15 CACHED

#16 exporting to image
#16 exporting layers done
#16 exporting manifest sha256:30ee3faebdf581a49713861678a5a2f96bc7e9657c7b4391db14565a0fa98ea7 done
#16 exporting config sha256:151f523b44d4b646cf15ab99063b8410482cd60ac3bcf0fc0e66ae9caac52533 done
#16 exporting attestation manifest sha256:abfd17a2b136dd530991d87077003101e42c88a147dd8fc10f8cf0af8c704021 0.0s done
#16 exporting manifest list sha256:13281f23fb0764977e218fe025f88a6c0dcc05859f1ac87b10f3b9098ba39452 0.0s done
#16 naming to docker.io/library/httparena-fulmine:latest
#16 naming to docker.io/library/httparena-fulmine:latest done
#16 unpacking to docker.io/library/httparena-fulmine:latest 0.0s done
#16 DONE 0.2s
[20:46:38] spec h1: fulmine
[info] waiting for server...
[info] server ready
httparena-spec-fulmine
httparena-spec-fulmine
[20:47:41] spec h2: fulmine
[info] waiting for server...
[info] server ready
httparena-spec-fulmine
httparena-spec-fulmine
[20:48:26] spec ws: fulmine
[info] waiting for server...
[info] server ready
httparena-spec-fulmine
httparena-spec-fulmine
[spec] h1  http11probe d50d818: 155/159 (4 failed)
[spec] h2  h2spec 2.6.0: 136/145 (9 failed)
[spec] ws  autobahn-testsuite 25.10.1: 244/244 (0 failed)
[info] wrote results/spec/fulmine.json
[info] saved site/data/spec/fulmine.json

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🛡️ Resilience Report

Adversarial load against each opted-in entry in a fixed memory/CPU box — does it survive, shed load, hang, or run out of memory? Verdicts are not scored into the composite. See docs.

✅ survived (1 pt) · ⚠️ degraded (shed load, then recovered — ½ pt) · 🟠 hung · 💀 crashed · 💥 OOM-killed · 🔌 no endpoint (entry doesn't implement the endpoint the attack needs — not scored). A connection the server reaped is the correct defense — a read-timeout or a size cap fired. The Load column is offered requests/sec · CPU cores busy on the Load client → on the Server (its cap is in the box header): low server CPU on a survived attack means the load isn't biting; client CPU pegged while the server has headroom means push harder.

⚠️ fulmine.js — score 30.5/41 (survived=1, degraded=½)

Box: 4 GiB / 2 CPU, a fresh container per attack.

Attack Exhausts Verdict Peak RSS Liveness fail Recovery Client est./reaped Load (req/s · CPU L→S)
slow-body memory ✅ survived 374.3 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 32768 / 32768 — · 2.73→0.25
slow-headers connections ✅ survived 287.2 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 32768 / 32768 — · 4.05→0.17
slow-read memory 💥 oom-killed 4096.1 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 28847 / 5466 — · 4.14→0.63
huge-chunk memory ✅ survived 202.4 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 32768 / 32768 — · 6.87→0.39
tiny-chunk-flood cpu ⚠️ degraded 3270 / 4096 MiB 88.9% 0s 9903 / 7593 58 · 1.38→1.98
chunk-extension-flood cpu ✅ survived 453.1 / 4096 MiB 0% 0.4s 32768 / 0 — · 3.73→0.91
chunk-size-overflow cpu ✅ survived 189.7 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 32768 / 32768 — · 6.05→0.42
content-length-prealloc memory ✅ survived 451.2 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 32768 / 31393 — · 2.69→0.4
large-upload memory 💥 oom-killed 4107.4 / 4096 MiB 60% 0s 29167 / 29167 — · 10.3→1.36
expect-100-continue memory ✅ survived 431.6 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 32768 / 0 — · 2.65→0.49
keepalive-hoard connections ✅ survived 258.9 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 32768 / 0 — · 3.13→0.27
header-bomb memory ✅ survived 629.8 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 32768 / 32768 8k · 26.41→0.85
header-count-flood memory ✅ survived 573.7 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 32768 / 32768 12k · 18.74→0.74
duplicate-header-merge cpu ✅ survived 516.3 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 32768 / 32768 12k · 12.12→0.64
pipelining-flood memory ⚠️ degraded 457 / 4096 MiB 66.7% 72.8s 3741 / 0 29.7M · 4.15→1.95
trailer-flood memory ✅ survived 137.4 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 32768 / 32768 — · 7.87→0.32
decompression-bomb memory 🟠 hung 1294.9 / 4096 MiB 84.2% dead 4894 / 350 180 · 0.69→1.89
decomp-codec-bypass memory 🟠 hung 1321.9 / 4096 MiB 85% dead 5947 / 1605 205 · 0.76→1.89
hashdos cpu 💥 oom-killed 4130.8 / 4096 MiB 41.7% 0s 23485 / 19409 7k · 2.7→1.08
json-nesting-bomb cpu 💥 oom-killed 4148 / 4096 MiB 80% 0s 29424 / 29424 15k · 3.95→1.63
multipart-flood memory 💥 oom-killed 4304 / 4096 MiB 57.1% 0s 25267 / 25267 2k · 8.7→1.66
redos-headers cpu ✅ survived 186.2 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 32768 / 32768 26k · 10→0.38
qvalue-cpu-bomb cpu ✅ survived 134.1 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 32768 / 32768 23k · 13.06→0.37
cookie-flood memory ✅ survived 150.1 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 32768 / 32768 26k · 11.33→0.37
percent-decode-quadratic cpu ✅ survived 174.5 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 32768 / 32768 25k · 11.94→0.39
range-bomb memory ✅ survived 144 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 32768 / 32768 26k · 12.57→0.37
json-bignum cpu ⚠️ degraded 3467.1 / 4096 MiB 83.3% 0s 17844 / 3565 8k · 1.18→1.91
continuation-flood memory ✅ survived 197.1 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 24936 / 24936 643k · 20.75→1.37
hpack-bomb memory ✅ survived 128 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 7105 / 7105 134k · 4.57→1.65
rapid-reset cpu ✅ survived 628.8 / 4096 MiB 9.1% 0.3s 1458 / 1458 7.3M · 44.63→2
madeyoureset cpu ✅ survived 343.8 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 32768 / 32768 11.9M · 66.97→1.49
settings-flood cpu ✅ survived 218.4 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 15688 / 15687 22.0M · 48.77→0.91
ping-flood cpu ✅ survived 254.9 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 16083 / 16083 29.8M · 58.78→1.03
empty-frame-flood cpu ✅ survived 556.1 / 4096 MiB 34.6% 0s 13274 / 13018 19.8M · 115.5→1.92
window-stall memory 💥 oom-killed 4096 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 13174 / 2952 — · 1.59→1.21
ws-giant-frame memory ✅ survived 96.5 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 32768 / 32768 25k · 23.78→0.84
ws-fragment-bomb memory ✅ survived 718.8 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 32768 / 32768 5.4M · 34.25→1.39
ws-deflate-bomb memory ✅ survived 587 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 32768 / 32768 4k · 13.9→0.54
ws-pong-flood memory 💥 oom-killed 4105 / 4096 MiB 46.2% 0s 10098 / 10098 51.0M · 109.45→1.48
tls-handshake-flood cpu ✅ survived 153.8 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 328 / 0 486 · 3.35→1.98
dheat cpu ✅ survived 76.4 / 4096 MiB 0% 0s 0 / 0 ⚠️ 4000 no-connect — · 0.86→0.13
What each attack does
  • slow-body — Drip a large declared body one byte at a time; tests the body-read timeout / whole-body buffering.
  • slow-headers — Hold connections with an unfinished, ever-growing header block; tests header-read timeout / caps.
  • slow-read — Request a large response then read it ~1 byte/sec; tests the send/write timeout and response buffering.
  • huge-chunk — Announce a 0x7fffffffffffffff-byte chunk; tests whether the server pre-allocates the declared chunk buffer.
  • tiny-chunk-flood — A chunked body of millions of 1-byte chunks; tests per-chunk framing/dechunk overhead.
  • chunk-extension-flood — 1-byte chunks each carrying a huge chunk-extension; tests read-amplification in the chunk parser (CVE-2023-39326).
  • chunk-size-overflow — A chunk-size near 2**64; tests whether chunk-size arithmetic overflows and crashes the parser.
  • content-length-prealloc — Declare a huge Content-Length and send no body; tests whether the read buffer is sized from the declared length (CVE-2026-5440).
  • large-upload — A huge uncompressed body delivered fast; tests whole-body buffering and the max-body-size cap.
  • expect-100-continue — Expect: 100-continue + a large Content-Length, body withheld; tests buffer reservation on the 100-continue handshake (CVE-2020-10705).
  • keepalive-hoard — Many complete keep-alive requests held idle; tests the idle-timeout and max-connection caps.
  • header-bomb — One complete request with a single enormous header value; tests the per-field / total header size cap.
  • header-count-flood — Very many tiny distinct header fields; tests the header-COUNT cap (CVE-2026-28980 era).
  • duplicate-header-merge — The same header name repeated N times; tests whether duplicates are joined with O(n^2) concatenation before dispatch.
  • pipelining-flood — Thousands of pipelined requests on one socket, responses unread; tests whether the inbound queue is bounded (CVE-2026-54273).
  • trailer-flood — A chunked body followed by an unbounded trailer section; tests the trailer-count cap, a header-limit blind spot (CVE-2026-22815 era).
  • decompression-bomb — A small gzip request body that inflates to gigabytes; tests whether request Content-Encoding is decoded unbounded.
  • decomp-codec-bypass — A deflate bomb labelled Content-Encoding: deflate; tests whether non-gzip request codecs are decoded unbounded (CVE-2026-42587 era).
  • hashdos — A form body of many keys; tests whether the body is parsed into an un-seeded hash map (O(n^2), CVE-2011-3414 era).
  • json-nesting-bomb — A tiny, deeply nested JSON body; tests the recursion-depth cap of the request-body parser (stack overflow -> crash).
  • multipart-flood — multipart/form-data with tens of thousands of tiny parts; tests the part/field-count cap.
  • redos-headers — Header values crafted for catastrophic regex backtracking; tests the header parsers (Accept/Content-Disposition/Range).
  • qvalue-cpu-bomb — A huge Accept-Language list; tests O(n^2) q-value sorting before dispatch (CVE-2020-27223).
  • cookie-flood — One Cookie header of many tiny pairs under the byte cap; tests the cookie-COUNT cap (CVE-2025-58186).
  • percent-decode-quadratic — A path of many percent-encoded tokens; tests super-linear percent-decoding in the router (CVE-2026-45822).
  • range-bomb — Many overlapping byte ranges on a static file; tests multipart/byteranges response amplification (Apache-Killer, CVE-2011-3192).
  • json-bignum — A single gigantic JSON numeric literal; tests arbitrary-precision number parsing (BigDecimal / quadratic int, CVE-2023-4043).
  • continuation-flood — Endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames with no END_HEADERS (CVE-2024-27316); tests the header-block cap.
  • hpack-bomb — One ~4 KB HPACK dynamic-table entry referenced by thousands of 1-byte indices (CVE-2016-6581 family); tests header-list size caps.
  • rapid-reset — Open-then-immediately-RST streams in a tight loop (CVE-2023-44487); tests unbounded stream dispatch.
  • madeyoureset — Force server-side RST via WINDOW_UPDATE(0) per stream (CVE-2025-8671); tests the Rapid-Reset-mitigation bypass.
  • settings-flood — Flood SETTINGS frames the peer must ACK (CVE-2019-9515).
  • ping-flood — Flood PING frames the peer must ACK (CVE-2019-9512).
  • empty-frame-flood — Flood zero-length DATA frames with no END_STREAM (CVE-2019-9518); tests per-frame overhead handling.
  • window-stall — Open many streams at a 0 flow-control window and never grant it (CVE-2019-9517); tests stalled-stream buffering/timeouts.
  • ws-giant-frame — A WebSocket frame header declaring a 2**63 payload length; tests receive-buffer pre-allocation from the declared length.
  • ws-fragment-bomb — Endless WebSocket continuation frames with no FIN; tests the fragment-aggregation cap (CVE-2026-48779).
  • ws-deflate-bomb — A permessage-deflate frame that inflates to gigabytes; tests the inflated-message cap (CVE-2026-1526 era).
  • ws-pong-flood — Flood PING frames, never read; tests whether the auto-PONG queue is bounded (CVE-2026-109932).
  • tls-handshake-flood — Many full TLS handshakes; the server pays the asymmetric crypto each time (THC-SSL-DOS class).
  • dheat — Offer only DHE and flood handshakes; forces a modular exponentiation per handshake, or reports immune if no DHE is offered (CVE-2002-20001).

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