How the API addresses each item of the OWASP Top 10 (2021), and what is deliberately left to the platform around it.
| # | Risk | What this codebase does | Where |
|---|---|---|---|
| A01 | Broken access control | Every endpoint needs a signed token except sign-in, health and API docs. Roles are checked per endpoint with @PreAuthorize. Citizens can only read and cancel their own requests, and get 404 rather than 403 for anyone else's, so IDs can't be probed. |
SecurityConfig, ServiceRequestController, ServiceRequestService.loadVisible |
| A02 | Cryptographic failures | One-time codes are stored only as BCrypt hashes. Tokens are HS256 with a key of at least 256 bits, which is required at start-up and has no default. Database storage is encrypted, connections stay in private subnets, and secrets come from AWS Secrets Manager. | OtpService, SecurityConfig.jwtSigningKey, infra/terraform |
| A03 | Injection | All SQL goes through JPA with bound parameters; the one native query takes no input. LDAP lookups build the filter with EqualsFilter, which escapes the username, and a test sends *)(uid=* to prove it. Input is validated with Bean Validation (national ID format, lengths). |
ServiceRequestRepository, StaffDirectoryLoginService, StaffDirectoryLoginTest |
| A04 | Insecure design | The request lifecycle is a state machine; illegal transitions are rejected by the entity itself. Optimistic locking stops two supervisors silently overwriting each other. Sign-in gives the same answer for unknown IDs so it can't be used to find registered users. | RequestStatus, ServiceRequest, OtpService |
| A05 | Security misconfiguration | Strict Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options: DENY, Referrer-Policy: no-referrer, nosniff and no-store on every response. Only health and info actuator endpoints are exposed. Errors are RFC 7807 problem details with no stack traces. The container runs as a non-root user. |
SecurityConfig, application.yml, Dockerfile, SecurityHeadersTest |
| A06 | Vulnerable components | Dependabot watches Maven, GitHub Actions, the Docker base image and Terraform providers. ECR scans every pushed image. | .github/dependabot.yml, infra/terraform/ecs.tf |
| A07 | Identification and authentication failures | Codes expire after 5 minutes, allow 5 wrong guesses, are single-use and are limited per national ID. Sign-in endpoints are rate limited per IP. Staff use Active Directory; blank passwords are refused because an empty LDAP bind can succeed anonymously. Tokens expire after 30 minutes. | OtpService, AuthRateLimitFilter, StaffDirectoryLoginService |
| A08 | Software and data integrity failures | CI deploys to AWS through OIDC with a role limited to this repository's main branch; no long-lived keys exist. Schema changes go only through versioned Flyway migrations, and Hibernate validates the schema at start-up. |
.github/workflows/deploy.yml, infra/terraform/github-oidc.tf |
| A09 | Logging and monitoring failures | Sign-ins (successful and failed), OTP requests and every status change are written to an append-only audit table in the same transaction as the change, with actor, role and IP. Codes are never logged. Container logs go to CloudWatch. | AuditService, LoggingOtpSender |
| A10 | Server-side request forgery | The API never fetches URLs supplied by users. Its only outbound calls are to the database and the configured directory. | — |
CodeQL scans the code on every push to main and every week.
- The sign-in rate limit is per instance and keyed on the client IP. Behind several instances,
or if a proxy's
X-Forwarded-Forcan't be trusted, add a shared limit in front, such as an AWS WAF rate-based rule. - Demo mode (
OTP_EXPOSE_CODE=true) returns one-time codes in API responses. It exists so the public demo can be tried without an SMS gateway and must stay off with real users. - Tokens can't be revoked before they expire. With a 30-minute lifetime that's acceptable for this service; a denylist or shorter tokens with refresh would be the next step.
Please email [email protected] rather than opening a public issue.