Use GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting for this repository. It was enabled and its public Report a vulnerability entry point verified on 15 October 2026 before binary release. Signing in to GitHub is required to submit a private report. No end-to-end test report was sent.

If it is unavailable, do not post sensitive details publicly. Contact the maintainer through an already trusted private channel, or make a non-sensitive request to enable private reporting. No separate email inbox is advertised.

GitHub instructions: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/security-advisories/working-with-repository-security-advisories/configuring-private-vulnerability-reporting-for-a-repository

For the 0.1.x developer preview, include version/build, macOS/architecture, reproduction steps using synthetic input, impact and a proposed mitigation if known. Never attach recordings, transcripts, summaries, voice embeddings, user documents, serial/device-owner identities, Partner secrets/tokens, authorization files, Keychain exports, databases, local logs or private diagnostic archives to public issues. Redact identifying paths and identifiers in private reports too. Do not test on other people's hardware or modify/delete real recordings.

The owner must nominate a responder and monitoring process before public launch. A suggested response target is acknowledgement within 7 days, followed by triage, coordinated disclosure and a security advisory when appropriate. This is a proposed process, not an already staffed SLA. Only the current preview is tested; old predecessor apps, arbitrary firmware and unsupported platforms are outside this repository's acceptance scope.

Inference is local-only: actual Speech/MLX worker launches use deny-network policy. The main native app is not claimed to be App-Sandbox-entitled; it uses macOS Bluetooth/location/local-network permissions, filesystem controls and bookmarks. No hosted inference fallback exists. User-triggered model downloads and initial PLAUD Partner authorization are separate network operations, not inference leaks. Initial provisioning exchanges credential/access-token metadata, obtains an RSA key pair from the Partner service, and sends device type/serial for a signature. Cached valid identity reconnect stays local; see README for the network boundaries. Credentials/identities belong in Keychain; temporary tokens are memory-only.

Imports/migrations must preserve originals and validate paths, file types, ownership/hashes, cancellation and output identity. Exports may share personal data only through an explicit user-selected destination. Build/export tooling uses an explicit public allowlist, rejects private assets/secrets/absolute home paths and never archives the whole working directory. These technical gates are not a formal security proof or a guarantee of no unknown secret/vulnerability.

Ad-hoc signing is integrity evidence, not Developer ID/notarization or a security endorsement. Never disable macOS protections to install a candidate.